STATUS REPORT

Long-Term Disaster Recovery Planning by Local Governments in the San Francisco Bay Area

October 2008

Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG)
P.O. Box 2050 - Oakland, CA 94604-2050
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San Francisco City Hall after the 1906 San Francisco earthquake

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For information on ABAG’s Earthquake and Hazards Program, see our Internet site at http://quake.abag.ca.gov
For information on ABAG’s Long-Term Disaster Recovery Planning Initiative, see our Internet site at http://quake.abag.ca.gov/recovery

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BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION

The Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG) mailed a questionnaire to the cities and counties of the San Francisco Bay Area to assess the status of long-term disaster recovery planning by those local governments. Long-term recovery refers to the repair and rebuilding process that will need to be undertaken by government departments such as planning, finance, housing, public works/building, redevelopment, and emergency management to start restoring their community after an earthquake or other catastrophic disaster. The results of the survey provide an assessment of what long-term disaster recovery plans are and are not in place in Bay Area jurisdictions.

While hazard mitigation is essential to minimize the damage of disasters to communities, having a comprehensive plan for the long process of recovery is often overlooked. Hurricane Katrina’s aftermath clearly shows the consequences of not preparing for recovery. New Orleans is still struggling to rebuild its communities, more than three years after Hurricane Katrina.

October 2008 marks the 140th anniversary of the 1868 earthquake on the Hayward fault, an opportune time for Bay Area governments to re-examine how they are laying the groundwork for a multi-faceted and multi-jurisdictional recovery process. Historically, the Hayward fault has a magnitude 6.7 or greater earthquake about once every 140 years. The last great earthquake on the Hayward fault resulted in extensive property damage and 30 deaths. In comparison, a similar magnitude earthquake on the Hayward fault now could cause billions of dollars in property damage. The impacts of the “big one” will be devastating because the Bay Area has become densely urbanized over the last 140 years. Now there are houses built directly astride or near the Hayward fault without any seismic retrofitting. Furthermore, the Hayward fault is only one of several major faults located in the Bay Area. We are in “earthquake country.”

The public expects their local government to be not only prepared for the initial response to the disaster, but also to have long-term recovery plans in place so that rebuilding can occur in a timely manner. For this recovery process to be expedited, steps need to taken now to lay the groundwork for recovery efforts. In the Bay Area, many jurisdictions are small and do not have staff or other resources to prepare for recovery efforts. Thus, ABAG hopes the topics covered in the questionnaire mailed to the cities and counties can be a starting point to prepare for long-term disaster recovery.

This report indicates the areas of recovery planning in which local governments are well prepared, could be more prepared, and need improvement. What individual jurisdictions have done, while important, is less important than to understand the overall status of recovery planning for the Bay Area as a whole. A major earthquake will not affect just small portions of a particular city. A large earthquake on the Hayward fault, or on one of the several other large faults in the region, is predicted to impact much of the Bay Area and many cities and counties. Therefore, this final report on the survey examines the collective sum of information and analyzes the status of recovery efforts throughout the Bay Area.

This report is part of ABAG’s Disaster Recovery Initiative. The questions asked of local governments were based on the recommendations of four issue papers on long-term disaster
recovery planning prepared for workshops in association with ABAG’s Regional Planning Committee. Those issue papers address: financing disaster recovery, housing recovery, recovery of business and the economy, and recovery of government facilities and services. The second half of this 8-paper series will address recovery issues related to infrastructure, education, public health, and land use change. These issue papers and other related resources are available online at http://quake.abag.ca.gov/recovery. During 2009, ABAG plans to create a template of best practices as part of the larger toolkit that provides technical assistance to local governments for recovery planning.

Ideally, jurisdictions will adopt all the components covered in this questionnaire over time to be as fully prepared as possible.

SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS

GENERAL

1. Reasons for Delays in Long-Term Recovery Planning – Most jurisdictions (83%) cited mitigation efforts as the prime reason for not doing more to prepare for long-term recovery efforts. Lack of time (45%), funds (39%), and staff (39%) were cited as the next most common obstacles. NOTE: Lack of staff was not included in the original list of obstacle options. It was cited in 39% of the 31 responses for “other.”

LONG-TERM DISASTER RECOVERY OF GOVERNMENT

1. Interface with the FEMA Reimbursement Process – The vast majority of jurisdictions (92%) have designated a department to oversee the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) reimbursement claims process and almost 60% of the Bay Area’s local governments have adopted a Local Hazard Mitigation Plan as part of their General Plan to ensure additional matching funds are available from the State of California for disaster reconstruction. Areas for improvement include adoption of a repair and reconstruction ordinance, documentation of pre-existing conditions, and establishment of a fund for emergency repairs. Only 22%, 36%, and 57% of jurisdictions, respectively, have these measures in place.

2. Emergency Purchases – More than half (52%) of local governments’ codes or regulations allow the city manager or county administrator to make emergency purchases over $100,000, which is a minimal amount. Of the 38 comments received, 50% stated there was no limit specified in the Municipal Code or other governing document; this is the most flexible and appropriate approach.

3. Resumption of Government Operations – Many jurisdictions have made considerable progress in ensuring that government operations and services can resume. They still have not fully completed preparations for their resumption, however. For example, 38% do not have back-up procedures or plans for making payments if normal finance operations are interrupted. Of this number, almost 25% plan to do so by December 2009, leaving
only 14% with no plans to do so. A total of 54% do not have a list of alternate locations for offices and community centers, though 26% plan to by December 2009 (leaving only 28% with no plans at the moment to make a list). In addition, 24% do not have back-ups of key records that can be accessed from alternate work sites, though 15% plan to by December 2009 (leaving only 9% with no back-up plans in the process of being initiated).

REBUILDING AND RECOVERY OF PRIVATE BUILDINGS AND THE ECONOMY

1. Mitigation of Residential Buildings – More extensive retrofitting of residential buildings is needed to preserve our housing stock, particularly of older single-family homes with “cripple walls” and multifamily housing with “soft stories.” Cripple walls are the weak outside wall of the crawl space below the floor one walks on and the perimeter foundation. Soft story buildings (typically built prior to 1990) have an open first floor to allow for parking or retail.

Only 16% of jurisdictions currently provide incentives for strengthening cripple walls of single-family residences. A clear majority (84%) of jurisdictions currently has no incentives for seismic retrofitting of single-family residences with cripple walls. Of this number, 8% plan to provide incentives by December 2009, leaving 76% with no plans to provide incentives.

Over one-third of jurisdictions (36%) indicated they do not have multifamily housing with soft stories. Thus, the following percentages only apply to those local governments with soft story multifamily buildings. Of the remaining jurisdictions with soft story buildings, only 11% of jurisdictions have mandated strengthening rules or provide incentives, while 20% plan to do so by December 2009. Thus, this issue is gaining momentum. Clearly, however, more needs to be accomplished because the majority (almost 70%) of the jurisdictions with these buildings currently has no plans for mandating strengthening or offering retrofit incentives to owners of these buildings.

2. Mitigation of Commercial Buildings – The first step in such a program is most likely to be a mitigation program for the most dangerous of these buildings, typically unreinforced masonry (URM) buildings. Relative to mitigation programs for residential buildings, more local governments have actively promoted mitigation of unreinforced masonry buildings in their commercial areas by requiring that these buildings be retrofitted or vacated. To address this danger, 48% of the 75 jurisdictions with URMs have succeeded in having all of their URMs being retrofitted or vacated. Local governments can facilitate retrofitting by providing incentives. This mitigation measure will drastically reduce property damage after a major earthquake and, more importantly, preserve the historic character and mix of small businesses in older downtowns during recovery. Currently, only a small number of the Bay Area’s 109 jurisdictions offer such incentives.

3. Expedited Processes – Building departments need to prepare for the high volume of work they will be required to do after a disaster. Having expedited processes for reviewing plans, granting permits and scheduling inspections for both residential and
commercial properties will help ease the recovery effort. While approximately half of jurisdictions have expedited processes in place, one quarter plan to do so by 2009 and about one-quarter currently have no plans to establish them. (Percentages vary slightly between plans for expediting housing and expediting commercial permitting.)

4. Assisting in Business Recovery – More planning departments need to be aware of the implications for small business recovery after a major earthquake. It is recommended that they identify key businesses and districts most in need of immediate resumption and include specific area plans in the General Plan. Only 37% have completed this process. While 25% plan to identify key businesses and districts by December 2009, 38% currently have no plans to identify them.

METHODOLOGY AND RESPONSE RATES

The questionnaire was sent out both by mail and e-mail to city managers and county administrators of all 109 ABAG member jurisdictions on July 3, 2008. The original deadline of July 22, 2008 was extended to August 29, 2008 to increase the response rate. In the interim, a preliminary staff report, list of respondents (by county), and PowerPoint slides were presented to ABAG’s Regional Planning Committee (RPC) on August 6, 2008 based on the 54 responses received by that date. (The RPC is composed of city and county elected officials and representatives of business, environmental, and equity groups.) As of the second questionnaire deadline of August 29, 2008, 85 jurisdictions had responded out of a total of 109, for an excellent response rate of 78%. A second presentation was made to the RPC at their October 1, 2008 meeting, based on a summary of key findings. The RPC’s commitment to long-term recovery planning for the region prompted a request that staff approach the remaining 24 jurisdictions who did not participate one final time. As a result, five more questionnaires were returned for a total of 90, for an extremely high 83% overall response rate.

None of the questions had a 100% response rate among those responding. Staff had mixed success with follow-up calls, which accounts for the varying response rates for individual questions. Of the 90 respondents, two (San Mateo County and San Bruno) submitted answers for less than half of the questions. The survey was conducted during the vacation summer months and a number of jurisdictions were undergoing management transitions, which may have contributed to the high number of incomplete responses. Finally, fully completing the questionnaire meant that any person filling it out would need to contact people in other departments, leading to a further increase in incomplete responses.

The questionnaire consisted of 28 questions and was divided into 5 sections. These included: Financing Recovery, Recovery of Businesses and the Economy, Housing Recovery, Recovery of Government Services and Operations, and General Questions and Feedback. The majority of questions had 4 response options:

- □ Yes
- □ No, but we plan to ___________ by October 2008.
- □ No, but we plan to ___________ by December 2009.
- □ No, we currently do not have plans to _____________.

4
These response options were followed by a space to add comments. Selective comments are included in this analysis.

For the purpose of analysis, the responses can generally be grouped into 2 categories. The first two responses can be grouped together as “yes” and the last two responses can be grouped together as a “no” response. The “No, but we plan to __________ by December 2009” response was intended to acknowledge initiatives in progress that might not have been completed by the time they received the questionnaire. This option also was provided to give jurisdictions an opportunity to plan for recovery efforts that they might not have been aware of, and to include it for future planning. The final option “No, we currently do not have plans to __________” does not necessarily mean jurisdictions will not address these recovery efforts in the future, but that they do not have plans to address them at this time.

The questionnaire and survey methodology had limitations. It is not a comprehensive, fully accurate assessment of the recovery planning efforts of each jurisdiction. In a few instances, there were discrepancies among answers from staff of different departments within the same jurisdiction. Therefore, this analysis is based strictly on the quality (accuracy) of data received. While, statistically, it reflects the status of recovery planning in the Bay Area, it is not an accurate representation of the precise readiness of any individual jurisdiction.

Note: Percentages in the following sections may not necessarily add to 100% due to rounding.
PART 1 – FINANCING DISASTER RECOVERY ISSUES

The recovery process cannot start without a flow of money. To a large extent, funding will come from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) after a catastrophic disaster. However, it is important to remember that local governments need to pay for recovery efforts upfront and are usually reimbursed by FEMA through a claims reimbursement process for those costs. The first part of the questionnaire addresses steps governments can take now so there are funds available to start the recovery process and funds will be received from FEMA with minimal negotiation.

More than half (52%) of local governments’ codes or regulations allow the city manager or county administrator to make emergency purchases over $100,000, which is a minimal amount. Of the 38 comments received, 50% stated there was no limit specified in the Municipal Code or other governing document; this is the most flexible and appropriate approach.
Having a legal provision allowing the city manager or county administrator to make significant emergency purchases will greatly facilitate recovery efforts. In the aftermath of a disaster, quick actions (such as clearing debris off roads) are imperative. If the chief administrator of a jurisdiction cannot legally make emergency purchases and is forced to go through the regular channels, a swift response will be compromised. In some cases, council or board approval may take considerable time or simply may not be possible. For example, enough council members may not be able to convene to have a quorum. Granting the chief administrator the ability to make necessary emergency purchases will greatly increase local government’s capacity to act quickly. For more information, see [http://quake.abag.ca.gov/recovery/info-purchase-authority.html](http://quake.abag.ca.gov/recovery/info-purchase-authority.html).

Only 22% of respondents have adopted a repair and reconstruction ordinance that increases the likelihood that you will receive funding from FEMA to repair buildings to a standard that reduces the likelihood of future damage in a flexible, cost-effective manner.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Response Percent</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes, a repair and reconstruction</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ordinance is in place.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, but we plan to have an ordinance</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by October 2008. (See template at</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://quake.abag.ca.gov/recovery/info-purchase-authority.html">http://quake.abag.ca.gov/recovery/info-purchase-authority.html</a></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, but we plan to have an ordinance</td>
<td>32.5%</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by December 2009.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, we currently have no plans to</td>
<td>45.8%</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>write an ordinance.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments</td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>answered question</td>
<td></td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>skipped question</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ordinance, which may be customized by a planning or building department's staff, visit [http://quake.abag.ca.gov/recovery/info-repair-ord.html](http://quake.abag.ca.gov/recovery/info-repair-ord.html).

The vast majority (92%) of respondents have designated a department or agency to oversee the FEMA claims reimbursement process, which requires extensive and meticulous paperwork. In most cases, this is the finance department. Having one department in charge of the complicated reimbursement process will make the process much smoother and increase the likelihood of receiving funds from FEMA. Local governments have done very well in this respect.

| 3. Has your jurisdiction prepared for the FEMA claims reimbursement process by designating a local government department or agency to track claims, the status of reimbursements, and interface with various state and federal government agencies? (This agency is often the Finance Department, rather than the Emergency Manager.) |
|---|---|---|
| Yes | 92.1% | 82 |
| No, but the procedures will be finalized by October 2008. | 0.0% | 0 |
| No, but the procedures will be finalized by December 2009. | 3.4% | 3 |
| No, we currently have no plans to set up such procedures. | 4.5% | 4 |

**Comments**

| **answered question** | 89 |
| **skipped question** | 1 |
Over one-third (36%) of jurisdictions have documented pre-existing conditions of government-owned facilities. Documenting pre-existing conditions of sewers and government-owned buildings, for example, greatly facilitates the FEMA reimbursement process because “pre-existing conditions” is the standard FEMA uses to pay for claims. If pre-existing conditions are not documented, as is the case for 64% of those responding, receiving funds from FEMA can become a very frustrating and protracted process because it is difficult to prove what damage was directly related to the disaster. Having documented pre-existing conditions, on the other hand, will make FEMA reimbursement process far simpler.

Based on the comments to this question, some jurisdictions indicated they did not realize FEMA required documentation of pre-existing conditions, while others are in the process of documenting their facilities or have completed the process. In several cases, insurance companies have required that pre-existing conditions be documented for insurance purposes. Whether pre-existing conditions are documented for insurance purposes or at the initiative of local governments, ensuring that this documentation is in place will greatly accelerate the speed at which reimbursement funds can be received by FEMA.
More than half (57%) of the jurisdictions have established an emergency fund. It is strongly recommended that jurisdictions designate a substantial fund to make purchases necessary for recovery. Without funds, recovery cannot start. One-third of jurisdictions currently do not have plans to establish an emergency fund. This is risky for two main reasons. First, considerable financial resources will be necessary for the high volume of projects that will need to be tackled. Moreover, claims submitted to FEMA may take many months to process. Both these circumstances support the argument for having a designated emergency fund. In most cases, jurisdictions are relying on their General Fund reserves to function as an emergency fund. Other funding options mentioned by jurisdictions included a capital reserve fund, the operating budget or a special projects reserve fund.
Not all Bay Area jurisdictions have special districts within their borders. Of the almost half of respondents (46%) who indicated they had no plans to coordinate with special districts, 11 indicated that either there were no special districts within its borders or that the jurisdiction operated its own utilities. If a jurisdiction has special districts, it is recommended they collaborate on the logistics of recovery. Valuable resources and time may be wasted if special districts are not included in the recovery process, as mentioned in the original question above. To a large extent, a jurisdiction’s schedule for recovery might depend on when a special district receives reimbursement from FEMA. While this may delay recovery efforts by the local government, it may be a better alternative to tearing up streets multiple times, at greater cost and inconvenience for those in the community.
Almost 60% of the respondents have adopted a Local Hazard Mitigation Plan (LHMP) as part of the General Plan for the jurisdiction. Adopting a LHMP makes local governments eligible for up to $3 million in FEMA funds per mitigation project. Also, by not having a LHMP adopted as part of the General Plan, jurisdictions will be responsible for a 6.25% co-pay that they would normally receive from FEMA after a disaster. Considering the extensive scope of damage expected, even a 6.25% co-payment for cash-strapped local governments will be a challenge. It is in each local government’s interest to take advantage of the compelling financial incentives offered by FEMA and the State of California by adopting an approved LHMP, and is therefore encouraged by ABAG. Participating in the update of the multi-jurisdictional Local Hazard Mitigation Plan effort led by ABAG during 2009 should make this effort simpler.
PART 2 – DISASTER RECOVERY OF LOCAL BUSINESSES AND THE ECONOMY

Local businesses are extremely vulnerable after a disaster. They typically have very limited resources, unlike national big box retailers. If a building occupied by a small business has been badly damaged, it has to be repaired or rebuilt, which may take many months or years. During that time, the business’s customer base might be slow to return or, if an entire commercial area of local businesses is impacted, the customer base might simply move away. After Hurricane Katrina, parts of New Orleans became ghost towns because recovery did not happen expediently enough for small businesses. In commercial areas, there also may be historical buildings which have more stringent federal rules for rebuilding.

While local governments are not directly responsible for business operations, they should help business communities prepare for disasters for several reasons. The historic character of an area may permanently be altered, blight may be a real possibility, and tax revenues may be heavily impacted. Economic repercussions, as well as ensuing social impacts such as gentrification, can easily transpire if small businesses are not prepared and do not have sufficient resources. If local governments do their part to prepare businesses for recovery and take the steps addressed in the questions below, revitalization of the economy and local businesses will be less chaotic.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Response Percent</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8. Have the unreinforced masonry (brick or stone) buildings in commercial areas of your jurisdiction been retrofitted?</td>
<td>42.9%</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40.5%</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15.6%</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments | 25

answered question | 84

skipped question | 6
Unreinforced masonry buildings (URMs) perform very poorly during a strong earthquake and are often uninhabitable. In past earthquakes such as Loma Prieta (1989), unreinforced masonry buildings were responsible for a significant portion of the billions of dollars in property damage, as well as for deaths and injuries. Local governments can minimize the impact of damage to unreinforced masonry buildings by requiring they be retrofitted or vacated.

The comments indicate that jurisdictions span the spectrum from “We have no tracking mechanism for this” to a mandatory ordinance such as the one City of Napa has in place. Most jurisdictions either are in the process of retrofitting their unreinforced masonry buildings or have a policy of notifying landlords without necessarily mandating retrofitting (the minimum required by state law). Of the 25 comments, 9 indicated they do not have any unreinforced masonry buildings in their jurisdiction. ABAG recommends local governments adopt mandatory retrofit ordinances. A minimum, as required by state law, is to notify landowners of the dangers of unreinforced masonry buildings.

To address this danger, 48% of the 75 jurisdictions with URMs have succeeded in having all of their URMs being retrofitted or vacated.
Many Bay Area jurisdictions have historic structures in commercial areas such as older downtowns. These historic structures add character to an area and in many cases, are invaluable since they cannot be replaced. This community value makes the seismic safety of these structures critical, particularly since they were built at a time when building codes were not rigorous enough to withstand a large earthquake. If historic buildings are not retrofitted, a community could lose not only a business, but face a more complicated process in rebuilding and restoring a historic building. There are separate, more demanding federal requirements for historic structures. The owners of historic structures (including local governments) in highly active seismic areas should be encouraged to work with engineers to retrofit their properties. The importance of conducting post-quake inspections also should be encouraged by local governments. If funding permits, local governments can provide incentives for retrofitting such as San Jose’s Redevelopment Agency did, or at the very least, notify owners that their building is unsafe in the event of a large earthquake.

Of the 85 jurisdictions who answered this question, nine noted they do not have any historic structures in commercial areas such as older downtowns. Three-fifths (60%) of the 76 jurisdictions with historic structures in these areas have worked with owners of historic buildings in commercial areas. An additional 11% of the 76 jurisdictions with these structures plan to work with owners by December 2009. One possible way for local governments to work with these owners is to develop an ordinance that addresses historic preservation, as is underway in Alameda County. Increased collaboration between local governments and owners of historic buildings will only improve the possibility that invaluable historic structures will be protected.
This question is particularly relevant to towns and cities, rather than counties which have relatively few businesses in unincorporated areas. Identifying key businesses or business districts most in need of immediate resumption will be critical to implementing a recovery plan. People will want to buy essential supplies, and businesses that can meet these needs ought to be prioritized for resumption. Local governments should communicate with these businesses to ensure their respective emergency plans are in place, and collaborate with these businesses to decide how the recovery process will unfold. While 37% of respondents indicated key businesses have been identified, an additional 25% plan to identify them by the end of 2009. Though this is a promising trend, 38% indicate that they have no immediate plans to identify these businesses.
If the General Plan’s Safety and Land Use Element is up-to-date and consistent with local zoning ordinances as required by state law, the future of commercial areas will be predetermined. A blueprint for how to rebuild will exist, eliminating the need to go through a consensus building process because it will already have been completed. Jurisdictions can simply (and relatively quickly) start the rebuilding process based on the General Plan. Without an updated General Plan that is consistent with zoning ordinances, an expedient recovery process cannot begin. Community members will want to quickly reach decisions on how to rebuild, which may undermine the benefits of due process. It is possible that better alternatives adopted in a non-crisis environment may be overlooked.

The majority (70%) of local governments have a General Plan which is updated and consistent with zoning ordinances, while 30% do not have an updated General Plan. Of the 18 comments received, 12 jurisdictions indicated they are either in the process of updating their General Plan or plan to update it within the next 3 years.
Typically, communities wish to rebuild their commercial areas exactly the way they were before the earthquake; however, this may not be possible because of current zoning ordinances. Long-term disaster recovery planning completed before the disaster will give local government departments time to find solutions that will retain the original character of an area. By not considering the impact of a disaster on the character of an area, the recovery process may be more complicated.

The majority (68%) of respondents have not addressed this issue. Of the 28 comments received for this question, 6 jurisdictions indicated that this component will be considered during the update of their General Plan.

One way to address this issue is to adopt zoning ordinances that address the restoration of an area’s character, and then overlay them on existing commercial zoning ordinances. This process has been conducted in Foster City.
Because the majority of Bay Area jurisdictions are densely developed, structural damage to buildings is expected to be extensive. The Northridge Earthquake of 1994 provides an example of the wide-spread property damage that will be exceeded in some earthquake scenarios in the Bay Area. As a large number of building owners simultaneously start the rebuilding process, building and planning departments can easily be overwhelmed by the number of permit requests after a large earthquake. In anticipation of the backlog, local governments should implement an expedited permit process for reviewing plans, granting permits and scheduling inspections.

More than half (54%) of jurisdictions do not have an expedited permit process in place. One way a local government can address this issue is to enter into a mutual aid agreement, as Santa Rosa has done. An alternative is to hire consultants, as Sonoma City plans to do. Whatever the contingency plan for expediting permit processes may be, having one will greatly alleviate the frustrations that could arise during the recovery process.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>13. Have special procedures to expedite the permit process for repair and rebuilding of commercial buildings been established for reviewing plans, granting permits, and scheduling inspections?</th>
<th>Response Percent</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes, they are established.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, but we plan to establish them by October 2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, but we plan to establish them by December 2009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, we currently have no plans to establish them</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

answered question 85

skipped question 5
Business turnover can easily happen with the financial burden of rebuilding. Rebuilding structural damage is very costly, which may force landlords to recoup their expenses through increased rents. This issue can be addressed by establishing long term development goals and standards, as Menlo Park is currently in the process of doing. Another option is to examine individual facilities, such as Fremont is doing. Specific area plans are another way local governments can assure the foundations of long-term recovery effort are in place. The establishment of specific area plans for commercial areas ought to be a collaborative effort with planning department, redevelopment agency and economic development staff. The majority (77%) of local jurisdictions do not have area plans that address business turnover, though several are considering it in the updates of the General Plan.
Small local businesses do not have the financial resources of larger businesses, and will need the help of local government. While the success of each small business is not the responsibility of local government, if enough small businesses are unable to recover, an entire commercial area could become a victim of blight. Through the help of Chambers of Commerce, government can outreach to small business owners to help them mitigate earthquake damages, for instance. Most importantly, ongoing communication and collaboration with small business owners may engender ideas in how they will respond to a major earthquake together. Plans and procedures for commercial areas with a substantial number of small businesses ought to be a collaborative effort.

The vast majority, 83% of jurisdictions, do not have a plan that supports the recovery process of small local businesses. Clearly, more needs to be done.
PART 3: LONG-TERM HOUSING RECOVERY

In the event of a major earthquake, the region’s housing stock may be heavily impacted and alternative housing will need to be provided by local governments. In the event that there is a M 6.9 quake on the Hayward fault, ABAG modeling estimates that there will be 155,700 uninhabitable housing units and 356,600 people displaced. Short-term housing can easily turn into long-term housing, so it is in local government’s interest to do all it can to encourage building owners to retrofit their homes. Even by instituting retrofit incentives today, the housing stock will not be seismically sound for several years. Thus, local governments need to plan to shorten the recovery process by identifying interim housing locations and formulating procedures for monitoring rents, repair costs, and rebuilding costs. They also need to design streamlined permitting procedures, and ensure that the General Plan and zoning ordinances are consistent with each other and with local policies.
Cripple walls are the short outer walls of the crawl space between the floor one walks on and the perimeter foundation. These cripple walls on single-family homes built before 1970 cannot withstand a large earthquake. Unfortunately, many Bay Area jurisdictions have single-family homes with cripple walls in their housing stock. For local governments who are in the recovery process, the larger the number of single-family homes with cripple walls, the higher the displaced population that will need assistance. Therefore, it is in local government’s interest to provide incentives for homeowners to retrofit their homes through reduced building permit fees or a partial rebate of a property tax, for example. Helping landowners invest in seismic retrofitting of their homes will ultimately lessen the burden on local government to provide housing for residents.

Only 16% of local governments provide incentives to strengthen homes with cripple walls. Of those who provide incentives, several mentioned offering low-cost loans or helping with preparations of “model” design (plan set) documents. However, the vast majority (76%) of local governments indicated that they currently do not have plans to provide incentives. Providing incentives now may substantially lower the number of people who will be displaced after a major earthquake, resulting in less of a need for both temporary shelters and interim housing.
Soft story buildings (typically built prior to 1990) have an open first floor to allow for parking or retail. Older multifamily housing with soft stories is extremely vulnerable to structural damage during a strong earthquake. Ensuring seismic retrofitting of soft story multifamily housing is even more urgent than single-family homes with cripple walls because ABAG modeling indicates that they typically will be responsible for about two-thirds of the uninhabitable housing units in future earthquakes. In addition, they can cause a higher number of deaths and displaced persons. For jurisdictions with a large number of soft story multifamily housing units, the probability that many of the residents will be unable to return to their homes for years is very high. Multifamily housing is frequently used by lower income residents. In addition, vulnerable populations such as the elderly or those with special needs are particularly at high risk. Unless building owners have enough funds to rebuild their structures, these vulnerable populations will be displaced and in interim and long-term housing offered by government. In the densely urban Bay Area, finding housing for tens of thousands of people will be onerous.

Of the 87 jurisdictions who answered this question, 31 noted they do not have any soft story multifamily housing and therefore are not included in this analysis. Only 11% of the 56 jurisdictions with soft story multifamily housing mandate seismic strengthening or provide incentives for such strengthening. An additional 20% of the 56 jurisdictions with this type of
housing plans to mandate strengthening or mandate retrofit by December 2009. Thus, this issue is gaining momentum. Clearly, however, more needs to be accomplished because the majority (almost 70%) of the jurisdictions with these buildings currently has no plans for mandating strengthening or offering retrofit incentives to owners of these buildings.

| 19. Has a list been compiled of potential locations and sources of local temporary housing that might be useable for an extended period of time after emergency shelters have closed? (Possible sources include motels, hotels, government-owned housing, and parks.) |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|----------|
| Yes, the list of local temporary housing options is complete. | 39.1% 34       |
| No, but we plan to compile a list of local temporary housing options by October 2008. | 0.0% 0         |
| No, but we plan to compile a list of local temporary housing options by December 2009. | 32.2% 28       |
| No, we currently have no plan to compile a list of local temporary housing options. | 28.7% 25       |
| Comments 16 | answered question 87 |
| skipped question 3 |

Based on the hundreds of thousands of people that are expected to be displaced, temporary or interim housing locations will be needed. While organizations such as the Red Cross provide shelters in the immediate aftermath of a disaster, local governments will be responsible for providing interim housing. Local governments should have a list of potential locations and sources of local temporary housing. Bringing in FEMA trailers is not feasible because of the lack of space in most of the urbanized Bay Area; in addition, they are extremely costly to transport.

Only 39% of local governments responding have created such a list, though an additional 43% are planning to compile such a list. The remaining 29% of jurisdictions need to consider where the displaced are going to be housed in the short-term and longer-term while their damaged homes are being rebuilt. Even if an individual jurisdiction is not directly impacted, it may need to house displaced residents of neighboring jurisdictions.
A jurisdiction’s building, planning, and housing departments can easily be overwhelmed by the number of permit requests, as a large number of landowners simultaneously start the rebuilding process. In addition to professionals in the construction business, there will be many others who will require extra staff time to explain the process, which will further slow down the number of permits that can be processed. Having a stream-lined permit process will move along the backlog. One possible alternative, adopted in Santa Rosa, is to enter into a contract so inspectors from another jurisdiction can be brought in to help manage the number of requests.

More than half (51%) the questionnaire’s respondents indicated they already have a stream-lined permit process in place. Almost half the Bay Area’s jurisdictions still do not have an expedited permit process in place, and preparing one can only help staff better serve the community and hasten the pace of recovery.
Only 5% of jurisdictions have adopted plans and procedures for monitoring rents and prices landlords and contractors will charge during the recovery process. Of the remaining 95%, only 6% have plans to address this issue by December 2009.

After a disaster, communities frequently want to rebuild as quickly as possible, creating a strong demand for contractors. This situation inherently puts contractors in a stronger position than the consumer, leading to more economic vulnerability. While local governments cannot mandate specific prices (controls), they can monitor the process and suggest an acceptable range for fees and rents. They can also note egregious abuses so that pressure can be placed on these companies by appropriate advocacy groups. While such monitoring cannot mandate that the original residents of a community are not priced out of their home, it can serve as an early-warning system to alert local governments when an area likely will become gentrified. Several jurisdictions are analyzing their options in this scenario and more should consider doing so.
Pre-planning the future of specific residential areas will afford local governments both time and sufficient stakeholder input to determine how an area will develop. If the Safety and Housing Elements of the General Plan are not consistent with the local zoning ordinances, the process of deciding how to rebuild will not receive due process. Having a blueprint in advance will avoid crisis decision-making and allow the recovery process to start far more quickly.

While 30% of local governments do not have an updated General Plan, almost all are either in the process of updating their General Plan or have plans to do so in the near future. Having a General Plan consistent with local zoning ordinances is required by state law.
PART 4: RECOVERY OF GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS AND SERVICES

Just as a community’s residents and businesses are affected by a large earthquake, local government operations and services will likely be impacted. If a jurisdiction is not prepared, helping the public will be extremely difficult. Local governments need contingency plans for alternative office space, as well as procedures for preserving and accessing the large volume of electronic data that is generated during the course of daily operations.

22. Does your local government have plans and back-up procedures to enable you to pay employees, social service recipients, and vendors if normal finance department operations are disrupted?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Response Percent</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes, we have a plan and back-up procedures in place for making payments.</td>
<td>60.7%</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, but we expect to have a plan and back-up procedures to make payments by October 2009.</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, but we expect to have a plan and back-up procedures to make payments by December 2009.</td>
<td>24.7%</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, we currently do not plan to have provisions or a back-up procedure in place to make payments.</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments 10

answered question 89

skipped question 1

Contingency plans ought to be made in case the finance department is unable to make its usual payments. Without back-up procedures, employees, social service recipients, vendors, and others who depend on the finance department will be without funds to recover from the disaster. Currently, several jurisdictions are examining financial services software with back-up capabilities, while others have piecemeal components in place. San Francisco has made significant progress in ensuring money continues to flow, even if government offices are physically not functional. Having mutual aid contracts or a back-up updated regularly at an alternate location will allow government services to continue with minimal disruptions. The majority of jurisdictions (62%) have prepared for this contingency, while an additional 25% plan to have such procedures in place by December 2009.
Government-owned buildings may be heavily damaged after an earthquake, to the point they may become uninhabitable. In this case, having a list of alternate locations that could serve as temporary locations from which government operations can resume will facilitate the recovery process. Residents will want to come to a physical location to receive government aid, and if the original building is uninhabitable, they need to know where a government office has temporarily relocated. Both city and county staff will need a physical space to provide services. If a list of alternate locations for government offices and community centers is compiled in advance, relocation can commence with minimal preparation. Jurisdictions can avoid the task of researching the many alternate locations and their feasibility immediately after the disaster by pre-designating possible alternative locations. More than half (54%) of jurisdictions do not have designated alternate locations.
Having back-ups of key records and other documents will expedite the recovery process. The majority of jurisdictions (76%) indicated they have a process in place. Particularly since government services are offered increasingly online, having back-ups is generally part of the job of IT professionals. Most jurisdictions recognize the importance of having back-ups of records and have integrated this component into their daily maintenance processes.
PART 5: GENERAL QUESTIONS

The last section of the questionnaire was designed to identify obstacles to long-term recovery efforts, and to gather feedback on what components would be most valuable for jurisdictions if ABAG prepared a model recovery plan.

OBSTACLES TO RECOVERY PLANNING

Finding out the principal obstacles to recovery planning will help formulate recommendations and feedback to decision makers on how to advance recovery efforts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>28. What are the principal reasons that your local government has not done more to plan for recovery after an earthquake or other disaster? Check all that apply.</th>
<th>Response Percent</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A-We don’t think disasters are much of a problem in our city/borough.</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-We have focused on preparedness, response and mitigation, not on long-term recovery.</td>
<td>83.3%</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-We don’t have the time.</td>
<td>46.2%</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-It would cost too much.</td>
<td>29.8%</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-We don’t know what we need to do.</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-We don’t have the ability to get funds required to do the work.</td>
<td>39.3%</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-We are concerned about identifying problems due to liability exposure.</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H-We haven’t gotten around to it.</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-It isn’t a high priority.</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-Other (please specify)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

answered question 84
skipped question 6

Note: For this question, respondents checked all the options that applied. Therefore, the percentages do not total 100% but reflect the number of checkmarks, based on the total number of responses.
The vast majority (83%) of local government respondents noted that one obstacle is that (B) they have concentrated on preparedness, response and mitigation. The recent memory of catastrophic disasters such as Hurricane Katrina has galvanized local governments to mitigate the effects of natural disasters and prepare for those impacts that cannot be prevented. Options D and F addressed the challenges of receiving enough funding to support recovery efforts; they were selected as an obstacle by 30% and 39% of jurisdictions respectively. Almost half (45%) cited (C) lack of time. With the number of competing priorities in a jurisdiction, unfortunately, long-term recovery is not at the forefront unless a disaster has already happened. Finally, of the 31 “other” responses, 39% specifically cited lack of staff.

The lack of staff was not included in the original list of options. The high number of respondents that listed it as “other” (39%) indicates that many jurisdictions see it as a problem. Many jurisdictions, especially the smaller ones, do not have an office of emergency services or an emergency manager. Frequently, the fire chief or police chief serves this function, or an emergency manager is shared between cities. Even in larger cities, emergency managers are operating with very limited staff support. For long-term recovery purposes, one possible solution is to engage the staff of planning, finance, housing, redevelopment, building, and other departments. While the emergency manager can coordinate efforts and provide guidance, many of the areas covered in this questionnaire can be addressed by other departments within local government. With the support of elected officials and senior management, each department can play a valuable role in ensuring long-term recovery planning is in place. Long-term recovery is not to be confused with emergency response.

This question sought to prioritize the obstacles indicated in question 25. Of the 196 responses for this question, the most frequently mentioned obstacle at 40 times was “C-We don’t have the time.” Options D and F, both of which dealt with funding issues, received 30 and 36 mentions, respectively. Collectively, they had the highest number of mentions (66). Option “B-We have focused on preparedness, response and mitigation, not on long-term recovery” was only cited 26 times. This may be because jurisdictions did not necessarily view preparedness, response and mitigation efforts as an obstacle, with its inherent negative connotation. The total number of answers combining options B, C, D and F was 132, which accounted for 67% of the responses. Inadequate staffing was mentioned 14 times.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE NEEDS

The next question was intended to identify local government needs in recovery planning assistance, as well as to set priorities on those needs.

26. Of the possible obstacles listed in Question 25, which do you feel are most pivotal in preventing more actions? List up to 3 letters.

27. ABAG is considering preparing a “model” local disaster recovery plan. What are the specific areas you would most like to be addressed in such a disaster recovery plan template? List up to 5. (You may wish to list any of the survey question numbers that correspond to those areas, if applicable.)
Virtually all of the subject areas covered in this questionnaire were requested as needing to be addressed in a disaster recovery plan template. Of the 263 responses, the most frequently cited issues for future information included financing recovery, assisting recovery of businesses, and identifying alternative housing locations. In addition, they requested that ABAG develop two templates—one for use by larger cities and a second for smaller cities. Local government staff also requested specific technical assistance and help in identifying ways to establish partnerships. Finally, they suggested topics for ABAG to discuss in future workshops and issue papers.

Financial Recovery – Local governments are extremely concerned about how they are going to pay for recovery after a disaster. To a large extent this concern revolves around the “nuts and bolts” of how to access aid from FEMA. Topics that cities and counties suggested were an explanation of FEMA’s reimbursement process, training on how to navigate FEMA’s complicated reimbursement process, and steps that can be taken to ensure FEMA will reimburse the majority of a local government’s recovery costs. Since millions of dollars are at stake, jurisdictions naturally should be concerned about how they will pay for recovery.

Local Business Recovery Assistance – Local governments frequently mentioned the issue of recovery of local businesses. Resumption of businesses is critical to their owners, the prosperity of a community, as well as the financial health of local governments. Increasingly, local governments depend on their local sales tax revenues, rather than residential property taxes to provide services to residents. Without a timely resumption of business services, economic recovery will be severely compromised.

Alternative Housing Identification – Questionnaire participants noted that alternative housing will be an immediate, and most likely, a longer-term challenge for local governments. Exploring and confirming a robust list of possible housing options will require approaching private businesses, existing government facilities and other jurisdictions. The more housing options a local government secures, the more robust its planning will be.

Technical Help Requests – The three most commonly cited needs for technical assistance included expedited permit processing, an ordinance for repair and reconstruction, and a Local Hazard Mitigation Plan (LHMP).

- ABAG’s proposed model recovery template plans to address how to expedite permit and inspection processing.

- A model repair and reconstruction ordinance is currently available online at [http://www.calbo.org/documents/Repair%20%20Reconstruction%20Ordinance%205-07.pdf](http://www.calbo.org/documents/Repair%20%20Reconstruction%20Ordinance%205-07.pdf). This model ordinance was prepared by the California Building Official’s (CALBO) Emergency Preparedness Committee.

- Jurisdictions who wish to adopt a FEMA-approved LHMP can contact ABAG to be included in ABAG’s multi-jurisdictional LHMP. During 2009, ABAG will be updating its multi-jurisdictional LHMP, making now an opportune time to be included. See [http://quake.abag.ca.gov/mitigation/plan.html](http://quake.abag.ca.gov/mitigation/plan.html) for information on the existing LHMP.
Assistance in Forging Partnerships – A number of local governments indicated they wished to forge partnerships to address recovery issues. Partnerships could take many forms, including a mutual aid agreement between two parties or a more extensive multi-party collaborative effort. Possible areas for collaboration suggested were (1) baseline inter-agency training for ways to prepare for long-term recovery, (2) the operation of a standardized local assistance center, and (3) access to alternative facilities. The ease of communication between agencies and municipalities was also mentioned, as well as the relationship between long-term recovery planning and coordination with the efforts of the Bay Area SUASI plans. The majority of responses that mentioned partnerships seem to want a uniform regional plan in which all Bay Area jurisdictions participate. While currently there are several piecemeal efforts at partnership, a comprehensive local umbrella organization that oversees the long-term recovery process does not exist. One example of a partnership that is working, however, is the meeting of staff from the Bay Area’s three major airports (SJC, OAK and SFO). This partnership has enhanced each airport’s FAA mandated Airport Emergency Plans and strengthened each airport’s policies and procedures.

Short-Term Emergency Response Help Requests – Some of the shorter-term response concerns after a disaster included debris removal, clean water sources, transportation, and damage to infrastructure. Local governments are searching for ways to integrate emergency response into short-term recovery planning, as well as how to integrate short-term recovery planning into the long-term recovery planning that was the topic for this questionnaire.

Additional Topics Recommended – Finally, local governments mentioned topics ABAG’s Earthquake and Hazards Program plans to address in the upcoming year. These include recovery issues related to education, infrastructure (including transportation and utilities), and public health.

BEST PRACTICES IN THE BAY AREA

Six jurisdictions offered to share their best practices. Some of these best practices can also be found in other jurisdictions.

Berkeley: The City Finance Section has set up emergency timesheet forms with daily task details. The forms can be filled out online and have features that automatically prompt all the correct dates within the pay period.

Fremont: The City has developed a Debris Management Plan, Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT), and Personal Emergency Preparedness (PEP).

Foster City: The City has offsite replication and hosting of key municipal information systems.
Marin County: The County has created a Post-Disaster Housing Plan.

Napa (city): The City has established pre-disaster contracts and agreements with vendors.

South San Francisco: The City has developed a disaster resource manual that provides a listing of vendors that it has pre-approved contracts with to provide food, water, shelter and sanitation services. In addition, the directory contains listings of critical infrastructure issues that need to be evaluated as well as populations at risk.

**SUMMARY AND NEXT STEPS**

This survey was conducted as part of ABAG’s Disaster Recovery Initiative. The intent of the questionnaire was to assess the existing long-term disaster recovery plans, as well as gaps, of local jurisdictions. The Hayward fault and other major faults in the Bay Area pose a significant risk to all Bay Area communities. Thus, now is the time for local government leaders to consider the consequences of not having sufficient long-term recovery preparations in place. Because cities and counties do not want to find themselves in New Orleans’ situation, long-term disaster recovery planning needs to be a high priority for all of the Bay Area’s jurisdictions.

The following summarizes the results of the questionnaire, dividing the responses to the various questions not by functional area, but into three performance categories: significant progress, mixed results, and needs improvement.

**Significant Progress**

- 92% of the cities and counties responding to the questionnaire have designated a department or agency to oversee the FEMA claims reimbursement process, which requires extensive and meticulous paperwork. In most cases, this is the finance department. Having one department in charge of the complicated reimbursement process will make the process much smoother and increase the likelihood of receiving funds from FEMA. This is very good news.

- 76% have back-ups of key records and other documents. In the event government offices are not accessible, having back-ups of key records at an alternate location will aid resumption of services.

- 70% have a General Plan that is up-to-date and consistent with local zoning ordinances for residential and commercial areas.
Mixed Results

- 62% have alternative procedures or plans in place for making payments to employees, vendors and social service recipients.

- 57% have established an emergency fund. In most cases, jurisdictions are relying on their General Fund reserves to function as an emergency fund.

- 52% of jurisdictions allow the city or county manager to make emergency purchases over $100,000. Of these 44 jurisdictions, 19 indicated that there is, in theory, no dollar limit specified for emergency purchases. Having no limit builds far more flexibility into the recovery process.

- 60% of the respondents have adopted a Local Hazard Mitigation Plan (LHMP) as part of the jurisdiction’s General Plan. Adopting a mitigation plan as part of the city or county General Plan makes a jurisdiction eligible for up to $3 million in FEMA funds per mitigation project. Also, by not having a LHMP, the jurisdiction will be responsible for a 6.25% co-pay for Public Assistance funds that they receive from FEMA after a disaster. ABAG encourages more jurisdictions to adopt a LHMP that is adopted as part of the General Plan. Participating in the update of the multi-jurisdictional Local Hazard Mitigation Plan effort led by ABAG during the coming year will make this effort reasonably simple.

Needs Improvement

- Only 36% have documented pre-existing conditions of facilities. Documenting pre-existing conditions of sewers and government-owned buildings, for example, greatly facilitates the FEMA reimbursement process because “pre-existing conditions” is the standard FEMA uses to pay for claims. If pre-existing conditions are not documented, receiving funds from FEMA will be a very frustrating and protracted process.

- Only 22% have adopted a repair and reconstruction ordinance. Having a repair and reconstruction ordinance helps secure FEMA funding and can help ensure that mitigation measures are incorporated into the rebuilding process. Who wants to be told by FEMA that it will only reimburse rebuilding of your city hall, built in 1950, to the 1950 building code? By adopting a repair and reconstruction ordinance, FEMA can help pay to rebuild to the improved and flexible standard designated in the ordinance.

- Only 16% provide incentives to strengthen homes with cripple walls. 76% of local governments indicated that they currently do not even have plans to provide incentives.

- Only 11% of jurisdictions with soft story housing mandate seismic strengthening of that housing, or provide incentives for such strengthening. In the event of a major earthquake, the region’s housing stock may be heavily impacted and alternative housing will need to be provided by local governments. Short-term housing can easily turn into
long-term housing, so it is in local government’s interest to do all it can to encourage building owners to retrofit their homes.

Next Steps

Clearly, there are areas where local governments have done a commendable job and others where more work needs to be done. It is important to emphasize that jurisdictions need to do as much as they can to prepare for an earthquake that will impact not just a small area or portions of a city, but the region as a whole. Because much of the Bay Area is highly developed, active faults, such as the Hayward Fault, can cause extensive damage to infrastructure, critical facilities, homes and commercial areas.

We do not have an advanced warning system for earthquakes as we do for hurricanes, but science tells us that in the relatively near future we will experience at least one “big one.” Knowing this, governments need to invest the time and energy to prepare for long-term recovery in advance of the disaster. ABAG is working with its member cities and counties to make long-term recovery a high priority for these jurisdictions.

Based on the results of this questionnaire, ABAG will create a template of best practices as part of the larger toolkit that provides technical assistance to local governments for recovery planning related to the four areas covered by this questionnaire: financing disaster recovery, housing recovery, recovery of business and the economy, and recovery of government facilities and services. ABAG will also be looking at recommendations related to four additional topics: infrastructure, education, health facilities and land use changes. These issue papers and other related resources are available online at http://quake.abag.ca.gov/recovery/ During 2009, ABAG plans to create a template of best practices as part of the larger toolkit that provides technical assistance to local governments for recovery planning. Finally, based on a concern expressed by a number of questionnaire responses, the toolkit will be designed to work for both larger cities and smaller cities, as well as for the specific needs of counties.
### APPENDIX – List of Questionnaire Respondents by County

#### Alameda County
- Alameda (city)
- Alameda (county)
- Berkeley
- Dublin
- Fremont
- Hayward
- Livermore
- Newark
- Oakland
- Pleasanton
- San Leandro
- Union City

#### Contra Costa County
- Antioch
- Brentwood
- Clayton
- Concord
- Contra Costa (county)
- Danville
- El Cerrito
- Hercules
- Martinez
- Oakley
- Orinda
- Pinole
- Pittsburg
- Richmond
- San Pablo
- San Ramon
- Walnut Creek

#### Marin County
- Belvedere
- Fairfax
- Marin (county)
- Mill Valley
- Ross
- San Anselmo
- San Rafael
- Tiburon

#### Napa County
- American Canyon
- Calistoga
- Napa (city)
- Napa (county)
- Saint Helena
- Yountville

#### San Francisco County
- San Francisco (city/county)

#### San Mateo County
- Belmont
- Brisbane
- Burlingame
- Colma
- Daly City
- Foster City
- Half Moon Bay
- Hillsborough
- Menlo Park
- Millbrae
- Pacifica
- Redwood City
- San Bruno
- San Carlos
- San Mateo (city)
- San Mateo (county)
- South San Francisco
- Woodside

#### Santa Clara County
- Campbell
- Cupertino
- Los Altos
- Los Gatos
- Monte Sereno
- Morgan Hill
- Mountain View
- Palo Alto
- San Jose
- Santa Clara (city)
- Santa Clara (county)
- Saratoga
- Sunnyvale

#### Solano County
- Benicia
- Dixon
- Fairfield
- Rio Vista
- Solano (county)
- Suisun
- Vacaville

#### Sonoma County
- Cloverdale
- Cotati
- Healdsburg
- Rohnert Park
- Santa Rosa
- Sebastopol
- Sonoma (city)
- Sonoma (county)